Stock and option markets can at times reflect differing information. We identify three reasons for the presence of these periods of 'disagreement' between the cash and derivatives markets: 1) high volatility and noise trading; 2) high level of risk aversion; 3) speculation versus hedging trades. This paper investigates the role that hedge funds, a proxy for sophisticated investors, play in the price discovery process between stock and option markets and the disagreement/ agreement periods. We observe that a disparity in information between the two markets is often associated with deleveraging in directional exposures and reversal strategies. Posterior to the event, active tactical asset allocation in small and value factor investing takes place. We investigate four specific macro events which resulted in significant rebalancing by hedge fund manegers: the Thai Baht depreciation, the Dot-com bubble, the credit crunch and the Nasdaq correction.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis delivered a series of shocks to the European and US economies: falling growth rates, rising unemployment, public deficits and debts. The crisis also had far-reaching consequences in terms of public opinion, most notably a significant change in the public's appreciation for financial markets and in particular the big banks. The overall public perception of capital markets, and more specifically the role of derivatives, has become increasingly unfavourable over the last few years. However, well-functioning financial markets play a key role in socio-economic development, particularly during economic recovery periods and derivative securities play a vital role in many risk management strategies. It is vital that markets operate efficiently during periods of distress, and that price consistency is maintained across markets. The law of one price states that identical securities (with regard to risk) should trade at the same price at all times. Bekaert, Engstrom, and Xing (2009) show that uncertainty and changes in risk aversion might move asset prices away from their fundamental values. Similarly, Chen, Han, Pan (2014) discuss how investor sentiment could create trading noise and limits to arbitrage and renders sensitive stocks more risky. In complete markets, the options market should not transmit any new information. Market frictions might however initiate a price discovery process between option and stock markets (Chakravarty, Gulen and Mayhew, 2004) especially when the trading volumes in options exceed the one in the market of the underlying security. There is a common perception that informed investors might first trade in the options market in order to benefit from the limited downside and the leverage effect (Black, 1975; Mayhew et al., 1995; Easley et al. 1998; Cao et al., 2000; Arnold et al., 2000; Pan and Poteshnan, 2003) . A disagreement between the two markets might thus reveal information conveyed by informed traders and that is initially incorporated into the options market. (Chakravarty, Gulen and Mayhew, 2004) .
In this paper, we show that periods of high underlying volatility favour noise trading and can create some form of inefficiency between financial markets. Specifically, we show that stock and option markets could transmit different information, i.e. the 'implied prices' as defined by Manaster and Rendleman (1982) and Stephan and Whaley (1990) diverging from the spot prices. Our work finds supports in DeLong et al. (1990) , who show that noise trading can cause stock prices to deviate from their fundamental values. We refer to this situation as a "disagreement/ inefficiency" event between the stock and option markets.
We contribute to the literature by investigating the role that hedge funds play in this price discovery process between stock and option prices. We examine their trading behaviour around periods of disagreement and agreement between the two markets. We first test whether hedge fund managers are able to anticipate such changes. There is strong evidence supporting the ability of hedge funds to exploit mispricing caused by noise traders. This has been supported recently in Giannetti and Kahraman (2016) who qualified hedge funds as "rational arbitrageurs" or in Jank and Smajlbegovic (2015) who show that short sellers, especially hedge funds, trade against mispricing. We also address their responsibility with respect to these short-term inefficiencies between the two markets. In reality, do hedge funds exacerbate or help reduce the amplitude of the price disagreement between the two markets? Indeed, there is some evidence that large hedge funds trade on private fundamental information (Irwin and Holt (2004) ). If indeed they first trade in options market, as would informed traders, those markets sgould be the first to reflect the information, thereby creating a disagreement. We perform event studies on the asset positions around the dates where there is a disagreement between implied prices between option and stock prices (and therefore a price discovery taking place and a flow of information coming from one market to the other). The analysis is performed for three distinct periods: before, during and after the disagreement period. 4 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature regarding the connection and information flow between stock and option markets. Section 3 describes the methodology employed to detect times of disagreement between stock and option markets and provides some economic insights regarding those specific periods. Section 4 examines specific times of strong imbalance of information between the two markets and the related activity of hedge fund managers. Section 5 analyses the global impact of all disagreement events. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
Recent evidence supports the close connection between the option and stock markets. The levels of the expected market volatility, skewness, and kurtosis for the next 30 trading days could be extracted from a cross-sectional series of out-of-the-money option prices (Bakshi et al., 2003) . These parameters are interpreted as follows. Option-implied volatility levels are powerful predictors of future realised volatility, while a decrease (resp. an increase) in the skewness (resp. kurtosis) of the market portfolio suggests an increase in the probability of experiencing strongly negative (resp. extreme) returns. Information about general market conditions could have hence an effect on the expected market risk related to both an investment or a company. On the one hand, these risk estimates have been shown to be able to anticipate asset allocation and thus risk exposures of fund managers (Hübner et al., 2015) . Investors with private information will preferably trade in option markets (lower short-selling costs, highly leveraged bets). On the other hand, changes in option prices may therefore reveal information about the underlying asset that are not incorporated in earnings expectation disclosures. Diavatopoulos et al. (2012) have shown the predictive power of changes in expected skewness and kurtosis as implied in option prices on stock returns prior to earnings announcements. These changes in implied moments reflect anticipated information of informed investors or analysts which, therefore, have predictive power for future returns. Besides, Chang et al. (2012) express their forward-looking measure of beta as a function of the variance and the skewness of the underlying distributions. They demonstrate the ability of option-implied moments to anticipate changes in future betas.
Price disagreement and information flows between stock and option markets
In this section we examine the information transmission between stock and option markets and investigate the variables driving the state transition. We consider the S&P 500 to determine those periods of agreement and disagreement. Firstly, we use the Put-Call parity relation to compute daily estimates of the S&P 500 implied stock price. This approach has been widely used in the academic literature (see for instance, Muravyev et al. (2013) ).
Three conditions need to be satisfied for the options to be included in the study. 1) Liquidity condition : There needs to have been at least one transaction for both the call and the put option of corresponding strike and maturity. If trading volume is nil for either, both options are eliminated.
2) Moneyness condition: The absolute value of log( S/K ) < 0.10 where S = Underlying price and K = strike price 3) Maturity Condition: All options must have a remaining maturity of between 7 days and 90 days.
We incopate the dividend yield of the S&P 500 in the call-put parity relation. The dividend yield is obtained from the NYU webpage.
With daily implied price estimates we define a disagreement day when the S&P 500 index price and the estimated implied price differ by more than 0.2 %. Furthermore, we define a disagreement month when the number of disagreement days in a month exceeds the agreement days, that is:
The agreement/disagreement state or regime between stock and option market is defined as binary variable where Y = 0 -> Agreement Y = 1 -> Disagreement Figure 1 shows the regime evolution. In order to understand the drivers of these two regimes, we assume a probit model where represents the vector of independent variables, β the coefficient vector, and β the z-value of a normal distribution. Under this specification, a 1% change in the independent variable Χ i will increase (decrease) the z-score of Prob(Y = 1) by β i . The set of independent variables include i) VOL t : the underlying volatility, that is the S&P 500 index volatility, ii)
: the amount of in-the-money Put options traded, iii) : the amount of out-of-the-money Put options traded, and iv) BEARISH t : the percentage of bearish investors as measure by the AAII Investor Sentiment Survey. 1 Hence, the probit model is defined as Table 1 • In times of high volatility, noise trading can be important and make stock prices deviate from their fundamental values as shown by DeLong et al. (1990) . This could push informed investors to perform sophisticated investment trades in the option markets in order to benefit from leveraged bets. The information content of their trades will therefore be transmitted first into the option prices and create a disagreement event between the two markets. A disagreement day is defined as an event in which the stock and option market disagree about the price of the stock. This evidence is supported by the positive coefficient on volatility into the probit analysis.
• On the contrary, Chakravarty, Gulen and Mayhew (2004) find a positive relation, although not conclusive, between higher underlying volatility and lower price discovery in the option market. We might relate this mixed evidence to times of high risk aversion (bearish markets) which command less price discovery as informed investors actively trade within the spot markets and therefore commands less disagreement between the information content of the two markets.
• The probit analysis shows that and contribute in different direction to the regime determination. An increase in leads to more disagreement between stock and option markets, an increase in indicates higher chances of agreement. Our interpretation is that in-the-money put options contrary to out-of-the-money put options are bought by informed traders to speculate (as also supported by the empirical experiment conducted by de Jong, Koedijk, and Schnitzlein (2001)).
5 1 -We also tested the significance of , , and BULLISH t , that is, the amount of in-and out-of-the-money Call options traded, and the percentage of bullish investors, respectively. These variables turned out to be not statistically significant and excluded from the analysis. Results are available upon request.
Examining hedge fund individual dynamic asset allocation
These new perspectives on stock and option market joint equilibrium have the potential to give insightful explanations about hedge fund dynamic trades. In this section, we examine whether hedge fund managers significantly alter their trades when there is a strong imbalance between the information content of option and stock markets. We study whether there is an unexpected rebalance in the risk exposure toward certain factors when the disagreement rate (defined by equation 1) experiences a shift larger than 45% from one month to another.
Strong imbalance -> |Disagreement rate t − Disagreement rate t−1 | > 45%
(2) Indeed, we find four different periods satisfying equation 2 which can be related to the following macro events: i June 1997: "Thai Bath depreciation" ii December 1999: "Dot-com bubble" iii January 2001: "Nasdaq downward correction" iv August 2007: "Credit crunch"
Expectation-implied changes in betas could hence be tested for their ability to explain how connected the option and stock markets are.
Time-varying risk exposure in hedge fund styles
In this section we obtain time-varying exposures toward certain set of risk factors. For this endeavour, we use the set of factors presented in Billio et al. (2010) which has been widely used in the hedge fund literature, see for instance Fung and Hsieh (2002) , Agarwal and Naik (2004) , among others. Each factor is defined as follows: 2 1. SP: the S&P500 index, characterising the US equity market risk factor; 3 2. SMB: Small minus Big index is computed as the monthly return difference between the MSCI world small minus MSCI world large; 3 3. HML: High minus Low index is computed as the monthly return difference between the MSCI world value minus MSCI world growth; 3 4. UMD: the Carhart momentum factor or the relative performance of winner over loser stocks; 5 5. EM: MSCI Emerging markets; 3 6. DVIX: first difference in the implied volatility of the US equity market; 5 7. GSCI: S&P Goldman Sachs Commodity Index; 3 8. Term: term spread measured as the difference between yields on 10-year and 3-month Treasury bill. It is computed as the difference between the US Citigroup treasury 7-10Y minus US Citigroup 3-month T-bill; 3 9. DEF: default spread measured by the difference between yields on BBB-rated and AAA/AA-rated corporate bonds and computed as the difference between the Citigroup US big corporate BBB minus Citigroup US big corporate AAA/AA. 3 We rely on Kalman filter to dynamically estimate the unobservable time-varying risk exposure.
In more detail, we assume a state-space representation where the observation equation describes the dynamic evolution of each hedge fund's returns and the state equation defining the unobservable risk exposure evolution is given as a random walk:
Where β i,t represents the time series of risk exposure to factor i, . In the same vein as DiBartolomeo and Lobosco (1997), we do not consider an intercept into equation 3, F i,t represents the time series of returns to factor i, and R t 6 the time series of returns for a given hedge fund strategy. Also, as in Agarwal and Naik (2000) , since hedge funds exhibit a great deal of flexibility in terms of asset allocation (ie, shortselling, cash holding, etc) we allow for negative exposure to risk factors and relax the constraint that the style weights have to add up to one.
Hypotheses to be tested and methodology
In section 4.1 we assumed a state-space representation where the unobserved risk exposure to each factor follows a random walk as in equations 4-5, and the filtered coefficients at time t + 1 are optimally computed by Kalman filter. Such representation provides crucial information about the β's distribution and statistical properties, in particular where the variance parameter of the process generator and the time-series of β coefficients are optimally filtered by Kalman filter.
Hence, we define the following set of hypotheses to be tested Hypothesis 1:
• null hypothesis H 0 : A strong imbalance event (as defined in equation 2) has no impact on hedge fund trades the month of the event.
• alternative hypothesis H a : A strong imbalance event triggers an unexpected reallocation hedge fund trades the month of the event.
Given the state-space model, the abnormal or unexpected allocation to factor n is defined as Under the null hypothesis, the abnormal allocation is normally distributed with Hypothesis 2:
• null hypothesis H 0 : A strong imbalance event is not preceded by an unexpected hedge fund trade reallocation.
• alternative hypothesis H a : A strong imbalance event is preceded by an unexpected hedge fund trade reallocation.
where the statistical properties are given as Hypothesis 3:
• null hypothesis H 0 : A strong imbalance event is not followed by an unexpected hedge fund risk reallocation.
• alternative hypothesis H a : A strong imbalance event is followed by an unexpected hedge fund risk reallocation.
where the statistical properties are given as In every case the null hypothesis H 0 can be tested as follows
Results
In this section we present the main findings for each strong imbalance event between the information content of option and stock markets: 4.3.1 Thai Baht depreciation Table 2 presents the abnormal trade allocation taking place in June 1997 identified as an event of strong imbalance of information between the stock and option market. Panels A, B, and C test hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, respectively. After a long period of slow down in the ASEAN exports volume, June 1997 is characterised by a big imbalance of information between the option and the stock markets (disagreement rate rising from 19% to 71%). On 2 July 1997, the lack of foreign reserves forced the Thai government to allow a floating rate for the Baht. One month before the decision of the depreciation of the Thai Baht by the Thai government, we observe significant abnormal deleveraging towards the Emerging markets for Global Macro (AA = -11.37 %, t β n = -2.4924) and Distressed Securities funds (AA = -11.06 %, t β n = -2.0727). More generally, directional exposures were also significantly reduced: Short selling and Global Macro funds substantially reduced their directional bets on the US market by -47.24 % (t β n = -3.2133) and -7.01 % (t β n = -2.6410), respectively. We observe commonly for Relative Value and Market Neutral funds a huge surge of credit risk with significant (in both cases t β n > 3) exposure reduction toward credit spread.
Distressed securities, L/S equity, and Market neutral funds appear to react with some delay to the information conducted in the option market by significantly decreasing i) momentum exposure by respectively -6.50 % (t β n = -1.9261), -4.53 % (t β n = -1.7283), and -8.52 % (t β n = -1.7247) and, ii) volatility exposure by respectively -7.45 % (t β n = -1.8963), -6.41 % (t β n = -1.8009), and -10.43 % (t β n = -1.9878). Furthermore, posterior to the event Distress securities funds keep reducing the exposure toward emerging markets (AA = -15.48 %, t β n = -2.9001) whereas L/S funds started to reduce their exposure by -30.15 % (t β n = -3.7568). Interestingly, we also observe a common pattern for Market neutral and L/S equity funds, right after the strong information imbalance both of them switched from a Large to a Small cap investment strategy (Market neutral's SMB initial loading = -37.11 %, AA = 46.68 %, t β n = 2.7259; and L/S equity's SMB initial loading = -28.53 %, AA = 35.49 %, t β n = 3.1682).
Dot-com bubble
In 1999, the Nasdaq surged by 85.58% as a sign of a financial bubble emerging in the technological and telecommunication sectors. Not surprisingly, the information was already shared by the informed actors of the financial actors as shown by a strong disagreement between the information transferred by the option markets and the stock market in December 1999 (the level of disagreement moved from 0.33 to 0.86 in one month). Table 3 presents the abnormal hedge fund allocation in December 1999. Panels A, B, and C test hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Right before the event took place, convertible arbitrage, market neutral, relative value, and short selling funds started to reduce actively their momentum strategies by -6.91 % (t β n = -5.0606), -11.16 % (t β n = -2.2578), -5.85 % (t β n = -2.6262), and -8.29 % (t β n = -4.8123), respectively; even shorting more stocks as shown by the abnormal short exposure in implied volatility exhibited by convertible arbitrage (DVIX initial loading = 13.65%, AA = -15.81 %, t β n = -3.0621) and short selling strategies (DVIX initial loading = 9.45%, AA = -29.68 %, t β n = -5.9235). L/S equity, merger arbitrage and funds of funds seem to react to this information with with certain delay through a sharp decrease into value stocks (-48,11% for L/S strategies, -10,78% for M&A strategies and -16,74% for Funds of funds) and a sharp decrease of trend-following strategies (-15,12% for LS strategies, -6,49% for M&A strategies and -8,62% for Funds of funds). Also after the event, Global macro, L/S equity, and Emerging markets funds reinforced their bet in the emerging market sector by raising their exposure by 16.12 % (t β n = 3.5330), 16.52 % (t β n = 2.0586), and 12.90 % (t β n = 2.1535), respectively. Table 4 presents the findings for the January 2001's event, Panel A, B, and C present the results of hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, respectively. On January 2001, the Nasdaq suffered from a large market correction (-51,07% on January 1st) which brought back a balance with regard to the information content between the option and stocks markets. Nasdaq's correction was mainly reflected by the reversal strategies implemented at the month of the event (Panel A) by convertible arbitrage (AA = -3.82 %, t β n = -2.7961), CTA global (AA = -13.80 %, t β n = -7.8839), global macro (AA = -25.33 %, t β n = -5.7290), L/S equity (AA = -4.84 %, t β n = -1.8467), merger arbitrage (AA = -6.89 %, t β n = -3.5790), emerging markets (AA = -2.41 %, t β n = -3.9699), event driven (AA = -1.56 %, t β n = -2.3448), and short selling (AA = -5.34 %, t β n = -3.1016). Interestingly, we observe that some hedge fund's managers seem to anticipate this correction by taking a short position in volatility one month before the event. Panel B shows that convertible arbitrage, distressed securities, L/S equity, equity market neutral, and relative value started with a long position in volatility and all of them implemented a short selling volatility strategy one month before the event by rebalancing their volatility exposure -15.74 % (initial loading = 10.29 %), -16.25 % (initial loading = 11.29 %), -6.67 % (initial loading = 5.61 %), -10.10 % (initial loading = 6.22 %), and -4.43 % (initial loading = 1.35 %), respectively. Table 5 shows the results for the event of August 2007, Panel A, B, and C present the results of hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, respectively. On 9 August 2007, the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve injected $90bn the financial market, still not enough to solve the deep credit crunch from which banks suffered. Not surprisingly, our model identifies for this month a significant disagreement between the information conducted by the option markets and stock markets. A post-reaction effect was to intensify reversal strategies as shown by CTA global (initial loading = -6.64 %, AA = -5.50 %, t β n = -3.1438) and global macro (initial loading = -7.91 %, AA = -10.85 %, t β n = -2.4546). As a consequence of the event, arbitrage strategies (event driven, fixed income arbitrage, convertible arbitrage) redefined the investment strategy toward credit risk by aggressively reducing the exposure, as shown by the significant and deep negative abnormal allocation in credit spread.
Nasdaq downward correction

Credit crunch
Examining hedge fund aggregate dynamic asset allocation
In this section we analyse the global impact of a regime switch in the information content, that is, we test whether a shift in the disagreement (agreement) level significantly alters the hedge fund's risk exposure. Hence, we define periods of increasing (decreasing) disagreement between the stock on option market and evaluate the aggregate impact on the asset allocation.
5
.1 Hypotheses to be tested and methodology According to the disagreement rate level (equation 1), we divide the disagreement/agreement state representation into quintiles ranging from strong agreement up to strong disagreement state. Figure  3 presents a sketch of this state representation where i) a state of strong agreement is defined when the disagreement rate level is contained between 0% and 20%, ii) a weak agreement state ranges from 20% to 40% disagreement level, iii) when the disagreement level interval goes from 40% to 60% is a not well defined state, hence we call it a diffuse state, iv) from 60% to 80% we define a weak disagreement state, and finally v) from 80% to 100% a strong disagreement state.
Considering this state representation we define the following set of events Event 1: Similarly to section 4.2, these kind of events are defined by a strong imbalance in the information content as in equation 2, that is a monthly change higher than 45% in the disagreement rate level. Event 2: Switch of state from strong agreement, weak agreement, diffuse, or weak disagreement to a strong disagreement state. Event 3: Switch of state from strong disagreement to strong agreement, weak agreement, diffuse, or weak disagreement state.
The aggregate abnormal allocation setup for each type of event is defined as follows (6) (7) where j = 1, 2, 3 represents event type 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and N j the total number of type j events. For any event, an individual abnormal allocation, is defined as an unexpected rebalance in the risk exposure toward certain factor, this unexpected rebalance can either be an unexpected reduction or increment in the β coefficient. The objective of this section if to test whether there is an aggregated effect for each event type regardless the sign of rebalancement, it means that there is no preferred direction for the abnormal allocation. Hence, in order to avoid any sort of compensation between unexpected reductions and increments, we consider each individual abnormal allocation in absolute value and define the following hypothesis Hypothesis 4:
• null hypothesis H 0 : Type j event has no impact on the asset allocation • alternative hypothesis H a : Type j event triggers an unexpected risk reallocation where defines the aggregated abnormal allocation effect and each individual event in equation 6 is defined as
We also test whether the significant changes in exposures we attribute to switches in regimes are not simply related to macroeconomic events and not directly to the switch in regimes. Within this objective, we examine whether there is a significant change occurring before or after the switch in regime. We therefore define two alternative hypotheses 
Results
In this section we present the main results for Events 1 to 3: 5.2.1 Event 1: Strong imbalance Table 6 presents the aggregate absolute abnormal allocation for event type 1: Panel A, B, and C present the results of hypothesis 4, 5, and 6, respectively. In general terms, we observe higher t β n related to hypothesis 4 than in the individual event analysis. This supports our previous evidence along which most hedge funds actively rebalance their portfolio when the information imbalance occurs. The information content is asymmetrical and the information flow rate varies across market participants: at time informed traders (sophisticated investors) redefine their investment strategy, we observe a strong imbalance between the option and spot market. Strong imbalance events might thus be a consequence of unexpected rebalancing in the portfolio of sophisticated investors reflecting the information asymmetry among market participants.
The most significant and active trades across hedge funds occur in momentum strategies, where t β n > 2 for 9 out of 13 hedge fund strategies the month of the event (hypothesis 4, Panel A). As expected, we also find evidence of momentum rebalancing after the strong imbalance event. By definition, a strong imbalance refers to a pronounced shift in the disagreement rate (more than 45% shift from one month to another) altering the information content between spot and option market. From our analysis, it appears that the month after the event the disagreement rate tends to remain stable. Since momentum strategies aim to capitalise of market trends, we expect further reallocation as the disagreement/agreement state stabilises.
Value and growth stocks strategies (HML) are also heavily altered in times of strong imbalance, the most intensive trades are found in CTA global, Emerging Markets, and Short Selling funds. Interestingly, we observe five different hedge funds (Convertible arbitrage, Event driven, Long/ short equity, Relative value, and Funds of funds) intensely rebalancing the allocation toward small-and large-sized firms strategy (SMB), and also five others (Convertible arbitrage, CTA global, Distressed securities, Merger arbitrage, and Relative value) heavily redefining the risk exposure toward volatility (DVIX) the month before the event (hypothesis 5, Panel B), which indeed might be considered as a warning signal for this kind of event.
Finally, we observe strong evidence of reallocation toward credit spread (DEF) the month after the event (hypothesis 6, Panel C). The strong imbalance tends to shift the current market conditions to a higher turmoil state, boosting credit distresses. Following a disagreement event, relative value funds, market neutral, arbitrage funds (fixed income, convertible arbitrage), and special situation funds (event driven, distressed funds) are shown to abnormally suffer under a credit squeeze as shown by the significant exposure change towards credit risk. In addition, directional funds such as CTA global, equity L/S, global macro and short selling funds actively rebalance their trades on the US markets before or at event date as well their emerging market risks. Table 7 presents the aggregate absolute abnormal allocation for event type 2. As in the previous section, Panels A, B, and C present the results of hypotheses 4, 5, and 6, respectively. This type of event is related to periods of increasing disagreement rate, that is, we observe a switch to a state of strong disagreement. The results are quite conclusive, most hedge funds redefine the risk exposure one month after the shift of state. Indeed, we observe how hedge funds "react" (rather than anticipate) when the information content between the spot and the option market migrates to a state of strong disagreement (disagreement rate > 80%). The most significant and active trades are found in momentum strategies (t β n > 2 for 11 out of 13, and t β n n > 3 for 8 out of 13 hedge fund strategies), value and growth stocks strategies (t β n > 2 for 8 out of 13 hedge fund strategies), and US equity market (t β n > 2 for 7 out of 13 hedge fund strategies). Some strategies are shown to anticipate markets disagreement convertible arbitrage, distressed securities, equity L/S, short selling, funds of funds and to a lesser extent equity market neutral and emerging market funds. Some strategies are shown to strongly react to inefficiencies between the two markets such as bond-like strategies, CTA global, special situation funds (distressed securities, event driven and merger arbitrage), global macro, relative value, short selling and funds of funds.
Event 2: Increasing disagreement rate
The credit spread factor also experiences significant risk exposure reallocation right after the event. Similarly to type 1 events (i.e. "strong imbalance"), a switch to a state of strong disagreement generates turmoil in the market causing credit distress and as a consequence, provokes an intense reallocation, specially to Convertible arbitrage, Fixed income arbitrage, and Funds of funds hedge funds. Directional allocation toward emerging markets also presents strong evidence of rebalancing, hardly surprising the most significant trades are found in Global macro (t β n = 2.9296) and Emerging markets hedge funds (t β n = 3.5251).
Event 3:
Decreasing disagreement rate Table 8 presents the aggregate absolute abnormal allocation for event type 3. As in the previous section, Panels A, B, and C present the results of hypotheses 4, 5, and 6, respectively. This type of event accounts to periods of decreasing disagreement rate, that is, we observe a switch from a state of strong disagreement to a lower state. Although we observe some reallocation toward momentum strategies the month of the event, dynamic exposures to credit and term risk spread before and at event date and value investment therafter, we do not observe commonalities across funds. Most trades occur indeed before or after the event except momentum.
The level of t β n are significant lower than in event type 1 and 2. Indeed, every time there is a regime change from a state of strong disagreement the outcome state turns out to be a state of weak disagreement, it means that the reduction in the disagreement rate is rather low and hedge funds managers tend to hold a similar risk exposure.
Concluding remarks
This paper considers specific events where some kind of inefficiency occurs in the information transmission between option and stocks markets. We identify three reasons for the occurrence of such "disagreement" or "inefficient" events: high volatility and noise trading, high level of investor risk aversion, increase in speculation versus hedging trades. We show that such events have significant implications in portfolio management by creating big opportunities for traders who implement reversal strategies and tactical style allocation between small, large, value and growth stocks.
We implement both an aggregate analysis of the impact of all events on hedge fund abnormal trades and individual analyses per event type. Both our individual and aggregate event studies show that strong imbalance of information between the stock and option markets, which we qualify of "disagreement events", are contemporaneous with abnormal portfolio rebalancement. Small increase in the disagreement rate is much more followed by a market reaction. Some strategies are shown to anticipate market disagreement events, namely convertible arbitrage, distressed securities, equity L/S, short selling, funds of funds and to a lesser extent equity market neutral and emerging market funds. Some strategies are shown to strongly react to inefficiencies between the two markets such as bond-like strategies, CTA global, special situation funds (distressed securities, event driven and merger arbitrage), global macro, relative value, short selling and funds of funds. Active trading also takes place when going back to an equilibrium between the two markets. We do not however spot any commonalities in abnormal rebalancing across strategies. Tough, the most active trades (at, before and after the event) are to be found for directional strategies (Emerging markets, equity L/S, global macro, CTA global), special situations funds (distressed securities and merger arbitrage), and convertible arbitrage funds.
Hedge funds are shown to actively rebalance their portfolios at times of strong information imbalance between the option and stock markets. Trading on momentum is by far the most dynamic strategy across all hedge fund styles. A reallocation in this strategy mostly occurs at event date, i.e. at times of strong imbalance between the information transmitted between the two markets and posterior to the event. Active trades are also to be found in factor investing (like value/growth and small/large caps), credit spread strategies and directional strategies (US equity and emerging markets). This might suggest that they either anticipate or create the imbalance of information. In case the information imbalance is out of their control, they heavily react using the same strategies.
We further identify four specific macroeconomic events that command or are associated with a strong information imbalance between the two markets: the Thai Baht depreciation, the Dotcom bubble, the credit crunch and the Nasdaq correction. The first three are identified as strong disagreement event while the last one is associated with a rapid transmission of information from one market to another in order to restablish agreement. Short volatility and reversals strategies are associated with the latter. Our results show that the Thai Baht depreciation was highly anticipated into the hedge fund industry and commands huge deleveraging in directional trades. Posterior trades on directional exposures and more allocation to small stocks are observed. The Dot-com bubble commands reversal, reduced allocation to value stocks as well as investments in both growth and small stocks. Among the disagreement event, the credit crunch was followed by hedge fund reactions but failed to be anticipated. Our work relates to Bernales, Verousis and Voukelatos (2016) who recently demonstrated strong herding behaviour in times of high market volatility or macroeconomic events in the underlying stock markets but also in the most sophisticated option markets. Stock price and option prices deviate from fundamental values as all trades are made in the same direction (no heterogeneity in views and liquidity) and options market is not appropriate for hedging or making leveraged positions. In our framework, we show that such events, mostly related to macroeconomic events, cause disagreement between the two markets. In 2012, EDHEC-Risk Institute set up ERI Scientific Beta, which is an initiative that is aimed at transferring the results of its equity research to professionals in the form of smart beta indices.
Appendix of tables
Appendix of figures
Copyright © 2016 EDHEC-Risk Institute
